The Epistemological Reading of Transcendental Idealism: A New Outline and Defense.

In my dissertation, I offer a new outline for and defense of the epistemological reading of transcendental idealism. According to the epistemological reading, the distinction Kant draws in the Critique of Pure Reason between appearances and things in themselves ('the transcendental distinction') is not a metaphysical distinction but a distinction between different ways of considering things. The epistemological reading is primarily contrasted with metaphysical readings of transcendental idealism, which take the transcendental distinction to be a distinction between different classes of things or properties. While it enjoyed some popularity in the second half of the twentieth century, the epistemological reading has come under sustained attack by the new generation of Kant scholars, and is routinely charged with confusion and incoherence. Enlisting the resources of contemporary philosophy of mind/language and metaphysics, I challenge the prevailing orthodoxy by offering a clear and concise formulation of the central commitments of the epistemological reading, developing a framework that delivers on those commitments, and answering the main objections that have been thought to make the epistemological reading untenable. [here is a longer abstract]

Published Articles

  • "Establishing the Existence of Things in Themselves," History of Philosophy Quarterly (2022). [philpapers]

  • "Kant on Perception, Experience, and Judgments Thereof," Kantian Review (2017). [philpapers]

In Preparation

  • "Practical Philosophy and the Transcendental Distinction" [draft available]

  • "Arguments for Noumenal Ignorance" [draft available]